Pro se litigants hold the same protected work-product privilege as attorneys.

Work-product protection rests on a simple insight: an adversary system collapses if one side can rummage through the other side's strategic thinking. Notes, drafts, theories, and preparation must be shielded, or preparation itself becomes a liability. Every rationale supporting the doctrine applies identically whether the preparer holds a bar card or not — the self-represented litigant's case theory is exactly as sensitive, exactly as strategic, and exactly as vulnerable to exploitation.

Denying the privilege to pro se parties creates a one-way mirror. Opposing counsel's file is sacrosanct while the self-represented person's thinking sits exposed to discovery, hand-delivering strategy to the adversary. A protection distributed by professional status rather than by function abandons its own justification. The doctrine protects preparation for trial; a pro se litigant's preparation is preparation for trial; the privilege follows the function.

The expected counterargument: work-product doctrine is tied to the attorney's professional role, and extending it to parties would let litigants hide evidence behind a privilege label. The second concern confuses two categories the doctrine already separates cleanly: facts and evidence are never work product, for attorneys or anyone else, and remain fully discoverable under this law. Protection covers mental impressions, strategy, and preparation — the thinking, never the underlying facts. The professional-role argument, meanwhile, has the doctrine's history backward; protection exists because adversarial litigation requires a zone of private preparation, and the attorney was simply the person doing the preparing in the cases that built the rule. When the party is the person preparing, the same zone is required for the same reason. Parity here costs the system nothing and merely stops rewarding one side for the other's lack of a license.