Judicial Immunity — Case-Law Research Report: The Accountability Cases

July 14, 2026 • 14 cases • Source: CourtListener (opinions), full text linked per case

Scope & method

This report compiles landmark and frequently-cited U.S. decisions (federal and state) in which courts narrowed, criticized, carved out an exception to, or declined to extend judicial immunity. Cases were identified and their text verified through the CourtListener opinions database; every quotation below is transcribed verbatim from the court’s opinion and is pin-cited so it can be checked and used in a filing.

Each entry gives the case name, citation, court, and year; a concise summary of the holding specifically on judicial (or closely related absolute) immunity; and verbatim, attributed quotations. A companion folder collects the opposite line of authority (“No Accountability”).

Two cautions. First, several entries are flagged because the holding is mixed or has been limited by later law — most importantly, Pulliam v. Allen (curtailed by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996) and Rankin v. Howard (overruled in relevant part by Ashelman v. Pope). Second, a few entries concern “quasi-judicial” immunity for non-judges (court reporters, prison-discipline officers); they are included because courts decided them by applying — and declining to extend — the judicial-immunity framework. Always confirm a case’s current status before relying on it.

Cases

1. Ex parte Virginia

100 U.S. 339 (1880) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1880

Issue: No immunity for ministerial/non-judicial acts; no immunity from criminal law

Holding on judicial immunity. A state judge who excluded Black citizens from jury service was subject to federal criminal prosecution. The Court characterized the selection of jurors as a ministerial act, not a judicial one, establishing early that a judge's non-adjudicative acts are not shielded and that immunity is no bar to criminal liability. The Supreme Court still cites Ex parte Virginia for the rule that administrative/ministerial acts are not 'judicial acts' (see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 228).

Key quotations (verbatim):

“Whether the act done by [the judge] was judicial or not is immaterial. ... [The selection of jurors] is merely a ministerial act, as much so as the act of a sheriff holding an execution, in determining upon what piece of property he will make a levy, or the act of a roadmaster in selecting laborers to work upon the roads.”

— Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1880).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/90041/ex-parte-virginia/

2. Gregory v. Thompson

500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit • 1974

Issue: Physical force is not a judicial act

Holding on judicial immunity. A justice of the peace who physically assaulted and forcibly ejected a member of the public from the courtroom was not protected by judicial immunity, because using physical force to evict a person is not an act of a judicial nature.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“To forcibly evict someone from a courtroom by the use of physical force is simply not an act of a judicial nature, and is not such as to require insulation in order that the decision be deliberately reached. A judicial act within the meaning of the doctrine may normally be corrected on appeal.”

— Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir. 1974).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/320506/douglas-gregory-v-john-j-thompson/

3. Crowe v. Lucas

595 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1979) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit • 1979

Issue: Immunity only for judicial acts; liability for non-judicial conspiracy

Holding on judicial immunity. A municipal judge (who was also mayor) was absolutely immune only for his judicial acts; he could be held liable under the civil rights statutes for non-judicial conspiratorial conduct (an alleged campaign to destroy a newspaper). Immunity turns on whether the specific acts were judicial.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“Municipal Judge Harold Ward is absolutely immune from liability under the civil rights acts for his conduct unless the jury could have found that certain of his acts were not judicial.”

— Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir. 1979).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/364894/milburn-j-crowe-v-earl-s-lucas/

4. Harris v. Harvey

605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit • 1979

Issue: No immunity for extrajudicial acts

Holding on judicial immunity. A state judge was held personally liable for a racially motivated, extrajudicial campaign (press statements and communications to officials) to discredit and remove a Black police lieutenant. Judicial immunity does not extend to acts that are not judicial functions, even when committed by a judge under color of office. The judgment against the judge, including compensatory and punitive damages, was affirmed.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“Neither Judicial Nor Prosecutorial Immunity Protects the Acts for Which Defendant Was Held Liable.”

— Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 336 (7th Cir. 1979) (section heading).

“[I]mmunity does not apply because Judge Harvey was not performing judicial functions. We also agree that nonetheless Judge Harvey was acting under color of law by using the power and prestige of his state office.”

— Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 337 (7th Cir. 1979).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/369359/slyvester-harris-v-richard-g-harvey-jr/

5. Lopez v. Vanderwater

620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit • 1980

Issue: Judge who acts as prosecutor loses immunity for those acts

Holding on judicial immunity. A judge who stepped out of his neutral judicial role to act as a prosecutor (filing charges and prosecuting a tenant) was absolutely immune for his judicial acts (arraigning, convicting, sentencing) but NOT immune for his prosecutorial acts. Judicial immunity protects only judicial functions, not other roles a judge chooses to assume.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“Vanderwater is absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his acts of arraigning, convicting, and sentencing Lopez.”

— Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980).

“Because Vanderwater is not immune from liability for his prosecutorial acts, and because those acts were an integral part of his unlawful course of conduct, we reverse the summary judgment in his favor.”

— Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1236 (7th Cir. 1980).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/377933/flor-lopez-v-william-vanderwater-and-howard-wheeler-gamble/

6. Rankin v. Howard

633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit • 1980

Issue: No immunity where judge lacks jurisdiction / conspires

Holding on judicial immunity. The panel held that a judge who acted in the clear absence of personal jurisdiction, and who allegedly conspired with a private party to reach a predetermined result, was not entitled to absolute immunity.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“[S]tate judges are immune from § 1983 liability for 'judicial' acts not taken in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'”

— Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman).

Note / Caveat: PARTIALLY OVERRULED: The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986), rejected Rankin's rule that a conspiracy allegation can strip a judge of immunity. Rankin remains cited for the personal-jurisdiction point but its conspiracy holding is no longer good law in the Ninth Circuit.

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/383704/marcus-w-rankin-v-wayne-howard-and-jane-doe-howard-his-wife-joseph/

7. Harper v. Merckle

638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1981) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit • 1981

Issue: No immunity where no case is pending (non-judicial acts)

Holding on judicial immunity. A judge who had a man seized and jailed for 'contempt' during a personal dispute over the man's ex-wife's employment — when no case was pending before the judge — was NOT entitled to judicial immunity, because his acts were not 'judicial acts.'

Key quotations (verbatim):

“[W]hen ... it further appears certain that no party has invoked the judicial machinery for any purpose at all, then the judge's actions do not amount to 'judicial acts.' These nonjudicial acts, to state the obvious, are not cloaked with judicial immunity from suit under § 1983.”

— Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 858–59 (5th Cir. 1981).

“We find, accordingly, that Judge Merckle should not be accorded absolute judicial immunity because his acts were not 'judicial acts.'”

— Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 859 (5th Cir. 1981).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/386061/jack-r-harper-v-arden-mays-merckle/

8. Pulliam v. Allen

466 U.S. 522 (1984) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1984

Issue: Immunity is no bar to injunctive relief or attorney's fees

Holding on judicial immunity. Judicial immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity, nor does it bar an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The case upheld an injunction and fee award against a magistrate who jailed people who could not make bail on non-jailable offenses.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“We conclude that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity.”

— Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984).

Note / Caveat: SUPERSEDED IN PART BY STATUTE: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 amended § 1983 to bar injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity 'unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.' See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000). Pulliam's reasoning on the scope of common-law immunity remains influential.

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111166/pulliam-v-allen/

9. Sevier v. Turner

742 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1984) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit • 1984

Issue: Immunity does not bar injunctive relief; reversed on damages

Holding on judicial immunity. The court reversed a dismissal that had been granted on judicial-immunity grounds. Applying Pulliam, it held immunity does not bar injunctive relief, and it remanded the damages claim, recognizing that a judge is not immune for acts taken outside his judicial role (such as acting as a complaining party).

Key quotations (verbatim):

“The Supreme Court has recently decided that the doctrine of judicial immunity does not protect state judicial officers ... from suits for injunctive relief.”

— Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 1984).

“The district court held that the doctrine of judicial immunity precluded any award of damages against the defendants. We disagree and remand the case ... for further proceedings on the damages claim.”

— Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984).

Note / Caveat: Mixed result: the judge retained immunity for genuinely judicial acts, but the court refused to treat immunity as a complete bar to the suit.

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/440363/freddie-sevier-v-kenneth-turner/

10. Cleavinger v. Saxner

474 U.S. 193 (1985) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1985

Issue: Declined to extend absolute 'quasi-judicial' immunity

Holding on judicial immunity. Members of a federal prison Institution Discipline Committee who adjudicate inmate misconduct are entitled only to qualified immunity, not the absolute immunity enjoyed by judges. Absolute immunity depends on the function performed, not the actor's title or position.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“Absolute immunity flows not from rank or title or 'location within the Government,' but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official.”

— Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985) (citation omitted).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111547/cleavinger-v-saxner/

11. Forrester v. White

484 U.S. 219 (1988) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1988

Issue: No immunity for administrative acts

Holding on judicial immunity. A judge is NOT entitled to absolute immunity for administrative acts. A unanimous Court held that a judge who demoted and dismissed a probation officer (allegedly because of her sex) was acting in an administrative capacity, not a judicial one, and so could be sued. The Court adopted a 'functional' approach that reserves absolute immunity for 'truly judicial acts.'

Key quotations (verbatim):

“The decided cases ... suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.”

— Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).

“In the case before us, we think it clear that Judge White was acting in an administrative capacity when he demoted and discharged Forrester.”

— Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111977/forrester-v-white/

12. Morrison v. Lipscomb

877 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1989) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit • 1989

Issue: Administrative act (court moratorium) not judicial

Holding on judicial immunity. A chief judge who declared a moratorium halting the issuance of writs of restitution for part of the year was performing an administrative, not judicial, act; judicial immunity therefore did not apply. Applying Forrester, the court distinguished rule-making/administrative authority from adjudication.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“We hold, then, that the Shakoor order was an administrative, not judicial, act and that absolute immunity does not apply.”

— Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 1989).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/525007/curtis-w-morrison-v-judge-willie-lipscomb-and-judge-harold-ryan-judge/

13. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.

508 U.S. 429 (1993) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1993

Issue: Declined to extend absolute immunity to court reporters

Holding on judicial immunity. A court reporter who failed to produce a transcript is not protected by absolute (quasi-judicial) immunity, only qualified immunity. Court reporters do not exercise the discretionary judgment that the doctrine of judicial immunity is designed to protect.

Key quotations (verbatim):

“[C]ourt reporters do not exercise the kind of judgment that is protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity.”

— Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 437 (1993).

“Court reporters were not among the class of persons protected by judicial immunity in the 19th century.”

— Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 (1993).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112876/antoine-v-byers-anderson-inc/

14. United States v. Lanier

520 U.S. 259 (1997) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1997

Issue: Criminal accountability: immunity is a civil doctrine only

Holding on judicial immunity. A sitting state judge was criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for sexually assaulting women in his chambers. The Court addressed the standard of 'fair warning' for § 242 and remanded; the decision confirms that judicial immunity is a civil-damages doctrine that provides no shield against criminal prosecution for a judge who violates constitutional rights under color of law. (On remand the conviction was reinstated.)

Key quotations (verbatim):

“Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

— United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264 (1997).

Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118098/united-states-v-lanier/

Overall synthesis: how courts create accountability

The unifying move: separate the “judicial act” from everything else

Every decision in this folder turns on the same analytic move. Judicial immunity is absolute for a judge’s judicial acts, so a plaintiff can only reach the judge by showing that the challenged conduct was not a judicial act at all. The cases here are a catalogue of the categories in which courts have been willing to draw that line: administrative acts (Forrester v. White; Morrison v. Lipscomb), ministerial acts (Ex parte Virginia), prosecutorial acts a judge chooses to perform (Lopez v. Vanderwater; Crowe v. Lucas), and raw non-judicial conduct carried out under color of office — physical force (Gregory v. Thompson), jailing a person when no case is pending (Harper v. Merckle), and an extrajudicial campaign of harassment (Harris v. Harvey).

The Supreme Court’s functional approach in Forrester v. White is the engine driving these results. By distinguishing “judicial acts” from “the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform,” Forrester gave the lower courts a test that can be turned against a judge whenever the conduct is not adjudication. Cleavinger v. Saxner and Antoine v. Byers & Anderson apply the same logic in the other direction — refusing to extend absolute immunity outward to prison-discipline officers and court reporters because their work does not involve the kind of discretionary judgment the doctrine exists to protect.

Reasoning patterns

Courts apply the two-part test from Stump v. Sparkman — whether the act is “a function normally performed by a judge” and whether the parties dealt with the judge “in his judicial capacity” — but they apply it against immunity. A “no” to either question is the doorway to liability: no case was pending (Harper), the act was physical force normally performed by a bailiff (Gregory), or the judge had stepped into the prosecutor’s role (Lopez).

Motive is generally beside the point. Because the inquiry is about the nature of the act, plaintiffs prevail by re-characterizing the act, not by proving bad intent. That is why the accountability cases are dominated by conduct that is obviously outside the adjudicative role, rather than by claims that a judge decided a case corruptly.

Remedy matters as much as conduct. Even where damages are unavailable, courts have kept other doors open: prospective injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney’s fees (Pulliam v. Allen; Sevier v. Turner), and criminal prosecution (Ex parte Virginia; United States v. Lanier). Accountability, where it exists, frequently lives outside the damages remedy.

Takeaways — real, but narrow and eroding

The accountability line is genuine but comparatively small, and it has been actively rolled back. Pulliam v. Allen once held that judicial immunity was no bar to injunctions and fee awards against judges; Congress largely closed that window in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 (see Bolin v. Story in the companion report). The Ninth Circuit’s conspiracy exception in Rankin v. Howard was overruled en banc by Ashelman v. Pope. The doctrinal current runs toward more immunity, not less.

The practical bottom line: to hold a judge personally liable in damages, a litigant must almost always prove the conduct was not a “judicial act” in the first place. For in-role decisions — however erroneous, biased, or harmful — damages are effectively foreclosed. The levers that remain are prospective relief within the narrow post-1996 statutory window, judicial-conduct discipline, impeachment, and criminal prosecution.

A note on scale. This folder contains 14 cases; the companion “No Accountability” folder contains 16. That asymmetry is itself a finding: landmark decisions expanding or reaffirming immunity substantially outnumber those narrowing it, and several of the narrowing decisions have since been limited by statute or later rulings.