Judicial Immunity — Case-Law Research Report: The No-Accountability Cases
Decisions in which courts created, expanded, or enforced judicial immunity
July 14, 2026 • 16 cases • Source: CourtListener (opinions), full text linked per case
Scope & method
This report compiles landmark and frequently-cited U.S. decisions (federal and state) in which courts upheld or broadly applied judicial immunity — including on sympathetic facts. Cases were identified and their text verified through the CourtListener opinions database; every quotation below is transcribed verbatim from the court’s opinion and is pin-cited so it can be checked and used in a filing.
Each entry gives the case name, citation, court, and year; a concise summary of the holding specifically on judicial immunity; and verbatim, attributed quotations. A companion folder collects the opposite line of authority (“Accountability”).
Several entries (Tenney, Imbler, Butz, Van de Kamp, Rehberg) concern the related absolute immunities of legislators, prosecutors, agency adjudicators, and witnesses. They are included because they are the doctrinal siblings and offspring of judicial immunity — the Supreme Court built them by analogy to judges — and because they show the same “no accountability” logic expanding across the justice system. Each such case is flagged as adjacent. One case, Dennis v. Sparks, is flagged as fitting both categories.
Cases
1. Randall v. Brigham
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1868
Issue: Early articulation of absolute judicial immunity
Holding on judicial immunity. An early Supreme Court statement that judges of general jurisdiction are not civilly liable for their judicial acts, even acts in excess of jurisdiction, absent (perhaps) malice or corruption. A precursor to Bradley v. Fisher.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[Judges of superior or general jurisdiction] are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, unless perhaps where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly. This doctrine is as old as the law, and its maintenance is essential to the impartial administration of justice.”
— Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/88036/randall-v-brigham/
2. Bradley v. Fisher
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1872
Issue: Foundational absolute judicial immunity
Holding on judicial immunity. The foundational American case on judicial immunity. Judges of general jurisdiction are absolutely immune from civil liability for judicial acts, even acts done maliciously or corruptly and even in excess of jurisdiction; immunity is lost only in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' The Court reasoned that the remedy for judicial corruption is impeachment, not a private lawsuit.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter.”
— Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351–52 (1872).
“If in the exercise of the powers with which they are clothed as ministers of justice, they act with partiality, or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively, they may be called to an account by impeachment and suspended or removed from office.”
— Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 350 (1872).
“[W]here it is alleged not only that his proceeding was in excess of jurisdiction, but that he acted maliciously and corruptly[,] ... he is, in my opinion, subject to suit the same as a private person would be under like circumstances.”
— Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 357 (1872) (Davis, J., dissenting).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/88468/bradley-v-fisher/
3. Tenney v. Brandhove
341 U.S. 367 (1951) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1951
Issue: Related absolute immunity (legislative); § 1983 did not abolish common-law immunities
Holding on judicial immunity. Legislative immunity. The Court held that § 1983 did not abrogate the common-law absolute immunity of legislators for acts within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, and that an 'unworthy purpose' does not defeat the privilege. This is the doctrinal root of the rule — later applied to judges and prosecutors — that the general language of § 1983 left pre-existing immunities intact.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“We cannot believe that Congress—itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language before us.”
— Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
“The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good.”
— Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
Note / Caveat: Adjacent doctrine: legislative (not judicial) immunity, but the foundational authority for the judicial-immunity line of cases.
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/104906/tenney-v-brandhove/
4. Pierson v. Ray
386 U.S. 547 (1967) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1967
Issue: Judicial immunity survives § 1983
Holding on judicial immunity. The Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not abolish the common-law absolute immunity of judges. A municipal judge who convicted civil-rights demonstrators under an unconstitutional statute could not be sued for damages, even if he acted maliciously and corruptly.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[This immunity applies] even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it 'is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.'”
— Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
“I do not think that all judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous their conduct[,] are immune from suit under [§ 1983].”
— Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/107411/pierson-v-ray/
5. Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S. 409 (1976) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1976
Issue: Related absolute immunity (prosecutorial)
Holding on judicial immunity. Extending the logic of judicial immunity, the Court held that prosecutors have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for conduct 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process' — even the knowing use of perjured testimony. The Court openly acknowledged that this leaves some wronged defendants with no civil remedy.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[A] prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages when he acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties.”
— Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976).
“To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”
— Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
Note / Caveat: Adjacent doctrine: prosecutorial immunity, derived directly from judicial immunity.
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109387/imbler-v-pachtman/
6. Stump v. Sparkman
435 U.S. 349 (1978) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1978
Issue: Immunity upheld on extreme facts (sterilization of a minor)
Holding on judicial immunity. The most notorious application of judicial immunity. A judge approved an ex parte petition to sterilize a 15-year-old girl, who was told she was having an appendectomy and discovered the truth years later when she could not conceive. The Court held the judge absolutely immune because approving the petition was a 'judicial act' and he was not acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'”
— Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978).
“[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”
— Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
“[W]hat Judge Stump did on July 9, 1971, was in no way an act 'normally performed by a judge.' Indeed, there is no reason to believe that such an act has ever been performed by any other Indiana judge, either before or since.”
— Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 367 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109820/stump-v-sparkman/
7. Butz v. Economou
438 U.S. 478 (1978) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1978
Issue: Related absolute immunity (agency adjudicators)
Holding on judicial immunity. While most executive officials receive only qualified immunity, the Court extended ABSOLUTE immunity to agency officials who perform adjudicatory or prosecutorial functions within a federal agency (administrative law judges, agency prosecutors), reasoning that their functions are 'functionally comparable' to those of judges and prosecutors.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[P]ersons ... performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts. Those who complain of error in such proceedings must seek agency or judicial review.”
— Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978).
“Judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities.”
— Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978).
Note / Caveat: Adjacent doctrine: extends judicial-style absolute immunity to agency adjudicators.
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/
8. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union
446 U.S. 719 (1980) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1980
Issue: Absolute (legislative) immunity for judges' rule-making
Holding on judicial immunity. A state supreme court and its chief justice were absolutely immune — under legislative immunity — for promulgating attorney disciplinary rules, and would have judicial immunity for adjudicative acts. (They remained subject to suit only in their independent enforcement capacity.) The Court reversed an attorney's-fee award premised on acts for which the justices were immune.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[T]he Virginia Court and its members are immune from suit when acting in their legislative capacity.”
— Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110273/supreme-court-of-virginia-v-consumers-union-of-the-united-states-inc/
9. Dennis v. Sparks
449 U.S. 24 (1980) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1980
Issue: Bribed judge immune (but private co-conspirators liable)
Holding on judicial immunity. A judge who allegedly issued an injunction as the result of a bribe and corrupt conspiracy was still absolutely immune from § 1983 damages. However, the private parties who bribed/conspired with the judge were NOT immune and could be sued, because they acted under color of law.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[T]he judge was immune from liability in a § 1983 suit, whether or not the injunction had issued as the result of a corrupt conspiracy.”
— Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 26–27 (1980).
“[A] private party involved in such a conspiracy, even though not an official of the State, can be liable under § 1983. 'Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute.'”
— Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980).
Note / Caveat: AMBIGUOUS / FITS BOTH CATEGORIES: The judge's own absolute immunity (upheld even for a bribed ruling) is a striking 'no accountability' holding; but the case is also cited for the accountability principle that private parties who corrupt a judge remain liable. Flagged per instructions rather than forced cleanly into one bucket.
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110353/dennis-v-sparks/
10. Mireles v. Waco
502 U.S. 9 (1991) • Supreme Court of the United States • 1991
Issue: Immunity upheld for ordering excessive force
Holding on judicial immunity. A judge allegedly ordered police officers to seize a public defender and bring him to court 'with excessive force.' The Court (per curiam, summarily reversing) held the judge absolutely immune: immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, and a judge is not stripped of immunity merely because an action was in error or in excess of authority.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge 'will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error ... or was in excess of his authority.'”
— Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1991) (per curiam) (quoting Stump).
“Ordering a battery has no relation to a function normally performed by a judge.”
— Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 16 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112655/mireles-v-waco/
11. Dykes v. Hosemann
776 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (en banc) • 1985
Issue: Immunity even without personal jurisdiction
Holding on judicial immunity. Sitting en banc, the court held that a judge who acts in his judicial capacity and has subject-matter jurisdiction is absolutely immune — even if he lacked personal jurisdiction and even if he acted erroneously or in bad faith. The judge who granted an ex parte custody order was immune.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[A] judge who possesses subject matter jurisdiction is not within the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction' posture which would deprive him of the use of the defense of judicial immunity.”
— Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 950 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/460405/dykes-v-hosemann/
12. King v. Love
766 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1985) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit • 1985
Issue: Immunity for judicial acts even in excess of authority
Holding on judicial immunity. A judge who set an allegedly excessive bond and misled the defendant about it was nonetheless absolutely immune, because setting bond is a judicial act within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Acts within jurisdiction are immune even if done in excess of authority or improperly.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“Provided that they do not engage in non-judicial acts or act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, judges presiding over courts of general jurisdiction are absolutely immune from suits for damages even if they act erroneously, corruptly or in excess of jurisdiction.”
— King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1985).
“[W]here a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction engages in judicial acts in deciding a case over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction, he is absolutely immune from suits for damages even if he exceeds his authority or his jurisdiction.”
— King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 968 (6th Cir. 1985).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/454703/johnny-king-v-robert-h-love/
13. Ashelman v. Pope
793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (en banc) • 1986
Issue: Conspiracy allegations do not pierce immunity
Holding on judicial immunity. Sitting en banc, the court held that a judge and prosecutor are absolutely immune even against allegations that they conspired to predetermine the outcome of a case; a conspiracy or bribe does not pierce immunity if the underlying acts are judicial. The court expressly rejected the contrary approach of Rankin v. Howard.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[A] conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges and prosecutors.”
— Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
“[A]llegations that a conspiracy produced a certain decision should no more pierce the actor's immunity than allegations of bad faith, personal interest or outright malevolence.”
— Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/471857/kenneth-o-ashelman-v-hon-gary-pope-judge-division-i-mohave-county/
14. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein
555 U.S. 335 (2009) • Supreme Court of the United States • 2009
Issue: Related absolute immunity (supervisory prosecutors)
Holding on judicial immunity. Supervisory prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 claims that they failed to train or supervise line prosecutors, or to establish an information system to track impeachment material (Giglio evidence) — even where those failures allegedly led to a wrongful conviction — because the claims are connected to the prosecutorial function.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“We conclude that a prosecutor's absolute immunity extends to all these claims.”
— Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 337 (2009).
“[P]rosecutors involved in such supervision or training or information-system management enjoy absolute immunity from the kind of legal claims at issue here.”
— Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 349 (2009).
Note / Caveat: Adjacent doctrine: prosecutorial immunity, extended to supervisory/administrative failures.
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145911/van-de-kamp-v-goldstein/
15. Rehberg v. Paulk
566 U.S. 356 (2012) • Supreme Court of the United States • 2012
Issue: Related absolute immunity (grand jury witnesses)
Holding on judicial immunity. A grand jury witness — including a law-enforcement 'complaining witness' — has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness's testimony, and cannot be sued even for allegedly conspiring to present false testimony to the grand jury.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“[A] grand jury witness has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness' testimony.”
— Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369 (2012).
“[T]his rule may not be circumvented by claiming that a grand jury witness conspired to present false testimony or by using evidence of the witness' testimony to support any other § 1983 claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution.”
— Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369 (2012).
Note / Caveat: Adjacent doctrine: witness immunity, part of the family of absolute immunities shielding participants in the judicial process.
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/626447/rehberg-v-paulk/
16. Bolin v. Story
225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit • 2000
Issue: 1996 statute bars even injunctive relief against judges
Holding on judicial immunity. Federal judges are absolutely immune from damages, and — after the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 — § 1983 now bars even injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity, unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. This narrowed the accountability window that Pulliam v. Allen had opened.
Key quotations (verbatim):
“In 1996, Congress ... amended § 1983 to provide that 'injunctive relief shall not be granted' in an action brought against 'a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.'”
— Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996).
Full opinion (authoritative source): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/770341/larry-bolin-kenneth-david-pealock-v-richard-w-story/
Overall synthesis: how immunity forecloses accountability
Absolute means absolute — for judicial acts
From Randall v. Brigham and Bradley v. Fisher through Pierson v. Ray, Stump v. Sparkman, and Mireles v. Waco, the Supreme Court has held that a judge is immune from civil damages for judicial acts even when those acts are erroneous, taken in excess of authority, or “alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” The single escape — acting in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” — is construed so narrowly that it almost never applies. Stump instructs that jurisdiction be “construed broadly” in the judge’s favor, and the circuit decisions here (Dykes v. Hosemann; King v. Love) confirm that mere subject-matter jurisdiction is enough to preserve immunity even where personal jurisdiction is absent or the judge exceeds his authority.
Bad motive does not matter. Malice does not overcome immunity (Pierson; Mireles); neither does an alleged conspiracy to fix a case (Ashelman v. Pope); neither, remarkably, does bribery of the judge (Dennis v. Sparks). So long as the underlying act is judicial, the reason behind it is legally irrelevant.
The doctrine expands outward
Judicial immunity is the parent of a family of absolute immunities. Using a “functional comparability” test, the Court has extended the same protection to prosecutors (Imbler v. Pachtman), including supervisory failures that produce wrongful convictions (Van de Kamp v. Goldstein); to agency adjudicators and administrative law judges (Butz v. Economou); to grand-jury and law-enforcement witnesses (Rehberg v. Paulk); and to judges acting as rule-makers (Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union). Tenney v. Brandhove supplies the master premise for the whole line: the general language of the civil rights statutes did not disturb immunities “well grounded in history and reason.”
And it has grown stronger over time. Where Pulliam v. Allen briefly opened the door to injunctive relief against judges, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 — applied in Bolin v. Story — slammed most of it shut, barring injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial-capacity acts “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
The justifications the courts repeat
Judicial independence is the through-line: judges must be free to act “with independence and without fear of consequences” (Pierson). The benefit, the Court says, runs to the public rather than to the individual judge. Alternative remedies — appeal, impeachment, and criminal prosecution — are said to make a damages remedy unnecessary and dangerous (Bradley). And the Court has been candid about the trade-off: in Imbler it acknowledged that absolute immunity “does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress” against official misconduct.
Takeaways — sympathetic facts, and immunity still wins
As applied, the doctrine approaches the absolute for anything a court can label a “judicial act,” and the labeling tilts toward the judge. The most telling feature of this folder is the sympathetic-facts pattern: the Court upheld immunity for a judge who ordered a 15-year-old girl sterilized under the guise of an appendectomy (Stump), for a judge who allegedly ordered police to seize a lawyer “with excessive force” (Mireles), and for a judge alleged to have issued a ruling because he was bribed (Dennis). These are not gaps the doctrine failed to foresee; they are the doctrine operating exactly as designed.
The practical consequence for an ordinary person injured by a judge’s in-role misconduct is stark: a Section 1983 damages claim is almost always foreclosed, and — after 1996 — even injunctive relief is largely unavailable. The remedies that remain (appeal, judicial-conduct commissions, impeachment, and, in extreme cases, criminal prosecution) lie outside the plaintiff’s control and rarely produce compensation.